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THE COLD TRUTH: HAVE ATTORNEYS
REALLY CHILLED THE SKI INDUSTRY?
Charles I. Sanders and Jacqueline Gayner*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the perception of the legal industry
among American alpine skiers had not been, to put it mildly, a flat-
tering one. Blamed for everything from logarithmic jumps in lift
ticket prices to trail closures, litigators stand accused of having im-
posed a severe chilling effect on a sport that boomed in the 1970's
but which has since substantially flattened out.'
Chief among the proponents of this theory have been members of
the ski media, who have regularly cited personal injury lawsuits
against ski mountains as the primary gravity dragging the ski indus-
try downhill. That proposition likely received its widest airing in the
1988 extreme skiing film, The Blizzard of Aahhs, a genre classic
viewed by millions of skiers throughout the world.2
In the film's narration, producer Gregg Stump railed that United
States ski areas had become so skittish about lawsuits that he was
forced to film his most death-defying ski sequences at Chamonix,
France, rather than right here at home, despite the willingness of the
* Charles I. Sanders seives as in-house counsel to the National Music Publish-
ers' Association, Inc., and is a member df the New York, California, and Washing-
ton, D.C. bars. He and Ms. Gayner, a student at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, have skied together since childhood at ski areas throughout the United States
and Canada. Each plans to retire from the practice of law to serve on the U.S.
National Ski Patrol at some time in the distant future.
1. The number of Americans who classified themselves as active skiers in 1972
was three million. By the close of the decade, the number had more than quadru-
pled to 14 million. John E. Fagen, Ski Area Liability For Downh/ll Injuries, 49 INs.
Coums. J. 36, 36 n.1 (1982). Between 1980 and 1990, the number of active skiers
basically remained static, dropping to 13.8 million in 1987 and leveling off at 15.5
million in 1990. Moreover, United States ski area visits that totaled 50.2 million in
1978-79 dropped to 50 million visits in 1989-90. Ted Farwell, Measuring De-
mand, Sia AjmA Mor., May 19, 1991, at 62. The good news for the ski industry is
that between 1980-90, revenue per skier visit rose at an annual compounded
growth rate of 8.2 percent, while operating costs increased at the rate of 4.5 per-
cent.
In 1990, however, less than 68 percent of ski areas showed an operating profit
(before interest and taxes) and fewer than a third showed a profit after interest pay-
ments. This illustrates that while the elite ski areas are doing well, the bottom two-
thirds of the industry are in severe economic trouble. C.R. Goeldner, 1989-90 Eco-
nomic Analysis, Si Ann& MoTr., Mar. 1991, at 58.
2. THE BL=ZmD oF AAms (Delamo Films, Ltd./Gregg Stump Productions 1988).
This film is available in VHS format through Delamo Films, 386 Fore St., Portland,
Maine 04101.
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movie's participants to sign full waivers of liability.' In fact, the
film's star, Scot Schmidt was featured in an on-camera diatribe
against the "fat lawyers" denying skiers the right to take responsibil-
ity for their own actions on the slopes.4 Mr. Schmidt concluded with
the suggestion-presumably satirical-that "people who sue ski ar-
eas should be shot." s
Emotions have also run high among skiers who perceive a corre-
lation between North American lift ticket prices and liability insur-
ance rates. The theory here is that the price of lift tickets increases
proportionately to the increase in insurance rates, which allegedly
have been driven up by personal injury lawsuits filed against ski
resorts. One need only spend a few minutes on any chair lift line to
gauge the hostility against attorneys by proponents of that plausible
theory. At Vail, Colorado, and Mount Snow, Vermont, for example,
a small, informal sampling of several dozen skiers last year 6 re-
vealed that nearly all believed frivolous lawsuits against the ski area
were a major factor behind the high lift ticket prices--currently
averaging $30 per day and ranging substantially higher at some re-
sorts.' Any attempt to refute this "abominable lawyer" hypothesis
has been made difficult by the outright refusal of the ski industry to
comment specifically on these perceived correlations. Before leap-
ing to the "obvious" conclusion that the Grinch-like reputation of
attorneys among the skiing public is well-earned, however, one must




6. The informal survey was undertaken by the authors during the 1990-91 ski
season. Twenty-four lift ticket buyers at Vail, Colorado, and an equal number at
Mount Snow, Vermont, were asked to list orally the factors which they believed
contributed to rising lift ticket costs in order of significance. Seventy-nine percent
cited litigation against the mountain (yielding awards plus insurance premium
hikes) as either the most or second most important reason for increases, and ninety-
eight percent listed it as a top-five reason.
A majority of those listing litigation as either the first or second important reason
for increases modified the word "lawsuits" with "frivolous," "bogus" or synony-
mous adjectives. Other reasons listed with frequency included "fewer skier visits,"%poor snow conditions/investments in snowmaking," "facility improvements," "in-
flation," and "price gouging by the mountain." The last response was listed as a
top-two reason by 12.5 percent of the respondees, most of whom expressed a belief
that lift ticket price increases far surpass the rising costs of ski area operations. See
Goeldner, supra note 1, at 58. Fewer than 10 percent of the respondees cited "un-
justified insurance hikes" as a top-five reason for price increases.
7. For a comparative analysis of lift-ticket price increases and the United States
consumer price index 1984-90, see John Henry Auran, Skiflation, SKIINo MAo., Nov.
1991, at 30. See also, Janet Nelson, Finding Bargains and Discounts on Ski Lift
Tickets, N.Y. Tue, Nov. 24, 1991, § 5, at 3, wherein the author notes that undis-
counted prices of daily lift tickets at Mount Snow, Vail, Okemo, Deer Valley and
other major United States ski resorts have risen above $40 for the 1991-92 season.
Sk Industry
Statistics indicate that between 1982 and 1989, plaintiffs in
United States ski injury suits prevailed in less than one of four cases
decided by a jury." That figure is in stark contrast to a recovery rate
for plaintiffs of about fifty percent in the late 1970's and early
1980's. It also illustrates a definitive, legislatively induced trend
away from ski area liability in cases involving injuries incurred
while skiing.9 Skiers now have the lowest rate of recovery among
all personal injury sports litigants who go to trial.10 In turn, the
amounts received by these plaintiffs in pre-trial settlements have rel-
atively diminished. 11
There is no empirical data available from any ski industry source
concerning trends in the number of ski injury lawsuits filed per year
over the past decade, anecdotal information gathered from individ-
ual ski areas indicates that there has been a noticeable decline in
these filings. 12 This decline may be a reflection of the substantial
drop in the annual number of ski injuries incurred since 1980,
rather than the downward trend in ski area liability.1 3 Regardless of
the reasons, the estimated 1,900 ski injury claims per year filed
against ski areas in the late 1980's represents a diminished number
8. Robert I. Rubin, Si Liability Law Cuts New Trails, TRm, Oct. 1990, at 108,
112.
9. Id. at 112.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Not one of the six major ski area legal representatives who confirmed such
"noticeable declines" in the number of lawsuits would speak on the record. Coun-
sel to one of the largest ski insurers in the United States also refused to be quoted,
but confirmed that his company's statistical records indicated a "modest" decline in
the number of claims litigated as the 1980's progressed and more states adopted
ski safety laws. That person also confirmed that the only published estimate of ski
accident claims, about 1,875 claims in 1988, as calculated by Irving Naylor of the
National Ski Areas Association ("NSAA"), was "in the ballpark." See Taking A
Dip In The Insurance Shark Tank, Sm AREA MosT., Sept. 1988, at 13 (quoting Ir-
ving Naylor). It is not difficult to surmise the reasons why no one in the ski industry
is willing to go on record regarding lawsuits. First, there is enormous fear that any-
thing uttered by a ski area representative regarding legalities will turn up later as
evidence in a suit, to the great embarrassment of the speaker. Second, the industry
believes that it stands to be damaged by a broader public perception that chair-lift
price hikes are outstripping ski area cost increases. An admission that lawsuits are
less of a threat today than in 1980 could bring about such a shift in public opinion.
13. "With improvements in equipment and skier education, the rate for most typ-
ical ski'injuries has declined dramatically over the past two decades." Josh Lehr-
man, Ski With Care, Sm MAo., Dec. 1991, at 20. In 1972, there were 105,000 ski
accidents/injuries, about six per every 1,000 skier visits. By 1980, the number of
accidents doubled, but skier visits tripled, dropping the ratio to 4.2 injuries per
1,000 skier visits. In 1987, with skier visits remaining constant from 1980, the
number of injuries dropped to 150,000, or three per 1,000 skier visits. See Fagen,
supra note 1, at 36 n.2; Taking A Dip In The Insurance Shark Tank, supra note 12,
at 13.
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from previous years. 14 Curiously, however, during the same period
ski area liability insurance rates inexplicably skyrocketed in double
and triple annual percentage figures'" and lift ticket prices rose at
more than double the rate of inflation. For that and other reasons,
the sport's economic expansion ceased. 16
Unfortunately for attorneys, the press and public paid far more
attention to the sheer number of ski injury lawsuits filed as a primary
reason for the industry's slump than to either the actual decline in
ski area liability or the unjustifiably staggering rises in insurance
rates.' 7 The ski industry reacted to the defensive finger pointing be-
tween attorneys and insurers over fault for the sport's woes with the
attitude "a plague on both your houses."' 8
I. BRIGHTER FORECAST
Fortunately for skiers, the bickering over blame for this decade-
long, winter festival of greed is made less relevant by the good news
currently ringing from every ski mountain between Sugarloaf,
Maine, and Mammouth, California. Over the past three years, insur-
ance rates for ski mountains have declined, on average, about eight
percent annually. 19 That trend probably will not result in a deep
drop in lift ticket prices. It may mean, however, that future price
hikes will be less formidable.
Even better news for expert skiers is the recent expansion of ser-
viceable "extreme" terrain at many mountains.20 "Three or four
years ago," writes industry commentator Chris Noble, "[tihe U.S. ski
industry was in the midst of a liability crisis. ... Trails were
groomed like golf courses .... Skiing, which had always been ex-
citing, sexy and maybe a little dangerous; became stagnant, a victim
"#2'of overzealous risk managers ....
The recent decline in liability exposure and insurance rates has
permitted ski areas to begin injecting some of the "on the edge"
14. Id.
15. See Goeldner, supra note 1, at 64.
16. See Farwell, supra note 1, at 62. See Auran, supra note 7 (regarding lift-
ticket prices).
17. According to NSAA spokesman Irving Naylor, sixty-two percent of the $52
million in liability insurance premiums paid by ski areas for the 1987-88 season
($33.75 million), represented profit to the insurance industry. Dick Williams of the
Western Ski Areas Insurance Plan answered Naylor's assertions by claiming that
the ski industry had also been the beneficiary of artificially low premiums in the
early 1980's due to fierce competition among insurance companies for investment
capital, and that such undercutting led to a substantial 1984 gross deficit for ski
area insurers. See Taking A Dip In The Insurance Shark Tank, supra note 12.
18. See, e.g., Tum BuazziiD OF A~ms, supra note 2.
19. Goeldner, supra note 1, at 58.
20. Bob Gillen, Extreme, Sm AREa Momr., July 1991, at 42.
21. Id. at 43.
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qualities back into skiing and snowboarding-a desperately needed
step toward attracting a new generation of skiers to a flat-growth
sport.22 Several ski areas are once again touting their double black
diamond and extreme terrain as principal attractions, including
Jackson Hole in Wyoming, Crested Butte in Colorado and Squaw
Valley in California.
With the snow tide having turned back to a time in United States
ski history when every fall was not a potential multimillion-dolar
lawsuit and each jaunt into the glades was not an invitation to hav-
ing one's lift ticket pulled, this seems like a good time to reflect on
the litigation and legislation that led the industry to the edge of the
crevasse and back again. Perhaps by studying the pitfalls of this
nearly lethal trip down the mountain, the next run will not be quite
so dangerous for the ski industry--or quite so embarrassing to a
legal community that has suffered nearly all of the slings and arrows
of disgruntled skiers for more than a decade.
II. SKI LITIGATION GENESIS
The deep base upo-i which the first United States ski injury cases
rested was a decision by the great jurist Benjamin Cardozo which
arose not on the slopes of Lake Placid, but near the beaches of
Brooklyn. In the 1929 Steeplechase Amusement Park case,23 Judge
Cardozo denied recovery to a man hurt on a Coney Island funhouse
ride because the plaintiff had assumed a foreseeable risk of injury
inherent in the amusement activity he had voluntarily undertaken.2 '
"Visitors were tumbling about the belt to the merriment of onlookers
when [the plaintiff] made his choice to join them .... ,"2- "He took
the chance of a like fate, with whatever damage to his body might
ensue from such a fall."12 6 Summing up, Judge Cardozo suggested
with simple eloquence that "[tihe timorous may stay at home."21 7
Not until 1951 did an injured skier bring a notable personal injury
lawsuit against a ski mountain, with predictably hostile results for
the plaintiff. In that case, Wright v. M. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 2 a wo-
man who suffered a broken leg when her ski struck a snow-covered
tree stump on a run at Stowe was denied recovery. Basing its deci-
22. "The USIA end-of-season business survey conducted by Dr. Marvin Kottke
produces what has been characterized as the 'flat' growth curve, varying from 50.2
million sider visits in 1978-79 to 50.0 million in 1989-90. Preliminary guesstimates
for the current [1991] season do not anticipate growth." Farwell, supra note 1, at
62.
23. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 174.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
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sion on the Steeplechase opinion, the court reasoned that a skier
accepts those obvious and necessary dangers that inhere in the
sport-such as falling over a hidden natural obstacle. 29
The decisions in ski injury lawsuits over the next twenty-five years
varied somewhat in their outcome, but the principle that a skier le-
gally assumes the risks of the sport generally was accepted over-
whelmingly by courts throughout the country.30 The general trend
was highlighted by a 1976 decision in which a Vermont federal dis-
trict court barred recovery from Okemo Mountain for fatal injuries
sustained by a skier who lost control and crashed into an unpadded
lift tower.31 The tower was found to be an obvious danger inherent
to the sport.3 2
Naturally, plaintiffs have fared better in ski lawsuits involving in-
juries sustained in chairlift accidents and other mishaps not directly
involved in the act of skiing, whereby the duty owed by the moun-
tain or the equipment manufacturer to the skier appears more obvi-
ous.3 3 Overall, however, ski mountains had relatively few reasons
to view litigation with more than the usual trepidation prior to Feb-
ruary 10, 1974, the day on which James Sunday decided to try ski-
ing at Stratton Mountain, Vermont.
Never on Sunday
Mr. Sunday, a 21-year-old novice skier traversing Stratton's
groomed bunny hill at the speed of a "fast walk," fell near the edge
of the wide slope and tragically struck a boulder off the trail.3 4 The
fall, which rendered him quadriplegic, was alleged to have been
caused by a piece of underbrush that had been covered by loose
snow.35 He was awarded $1.5 million in damages at trial, a deci-
sion appealed by Stratton to the Supreme Court of Vermont.38
In June 1978, the verdict was affirmed."7 The court rejected
Stratton's arguments that Mr. Sunday had assumed the risk of just
29. Id. at 791.
30. See, e.g., Arthur B. Ferguson, Jr., Allocation of the Risks of Skiing: A Call
for the Reapplication of Fundamental Common Law Principles, 67 DeNy. U. L. Rzv.
165 (1990).
31. Leopold v. Okemo Mountain Inc., 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976).
32. Id. at 786-87.
33. It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with matters outside the main
issue of ski area liability for injuries incurred in the act of skiing. For an expanded
view of other liability issues concerning the sport, such as the duties of skiers to
other skiers (collisions, etc.), the duties of equipment manufacturers and renters to
skiers, and the duties of ski lift operators. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 30; Rubin,
supra note 8.
34. Sunday v. Stratton, Corp., 390 A.2d 398, 401 (Vt. 1978).
35. Id. at 400-01.
36. Id. at 400.
37. Id. at 407.
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such an injury, and that Stratton had fulfilled any duty it may have
had to the skier by exercising due care in constantly grooming the
novice slope on which he was injured."8 The court ruled that Strat-
ton had breached its duty to Mr. Sunday by not successfully clearing
the underbrush.3 9
"ITihe timorous no longer need stay at home," wrote Justice Lar-
row in sarcastically denying the application of the Steeplechase and
Mount Mansfield holdings to the Sunday case.40 "[Today,] [t]here is
[a] concerted effort to attract their patronage and to provide novice
trails suitable for their use."' 4 1 Thus, Stratton had an absolute duty to
properly maintain its novice slopes free of known hidden dangers.42
Its failure to do so constituted negligence for which it was liable.43
Ski mountain operators and their insurers reacted to the Sunday
decision with unmitigated panic. 44 This was exacerbated by insur-
ance industry commentators who predicted an avalanche of un-
defendable lawsuits. "The few who assume the risk of [skiing]
without seeking redress in the law have vanished like the Ptera-
nodon," wrote one.45 "In some jurisdictions, it appears that ski acci-
dent plaintiffs have an almost automatic right of recovery."46
As a result of this alleged explosion in liability exposure, insur-
ance rates doubled and tripled for ski mountains throughout
America.47 At some mountains, the percentage of lift ticket prices
allocated to insurance costs increased by a factor of five, launching
consumer prices skyward.48 According to the insurance industry,
the limited number of insureds (about 400 American ski areas)
made spreading the risk difficult and smaller rate jumps
impossible.49
III. THE LEGISLATIVE ERA
Ironically, the blizzard of legal activity spawned by Sunday
turned out in large part to be legislative, not litigious. Through the
successful lobbying efforts of the ski industry, at least twenty-four
states had enacted statutes which enumerated the respective duties
38. Id. at 403.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 402.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 403.
44. Clarance E. Hagglund, Ski Liabilify, 32 FED'N INs. CouNs. Q. 223 (1982).
45. Id. at 223. "Pteranodon" refers to a member of the Pterosaurial order of
extinct flying reptiles.
46. Id.
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and risks of skiers and ski area operators by the end of the 1980's.sO
The enactment of these laws was premised on two basic public pol-
icy goals: To ensure a high degree of salety for citizens engaging in
the sport; and to protect the local ski industry economy. Four gen-
eral categories of legislation have developed among the twenty-four
state statutes currently in force. s '
The first type of statute is the "general assumption of the risk" va-
riety, typified by the law enacted by Vermont following the Sunday
decision . 2 It mandates that skiers accept as a matter of law the ob-
vious and necessary dangers of the sport, but does not specifically
list skier risks and ski area duties."3 The legislative record of the
Vermont Legislature specifically rejects the Sunday decision in
favor of the broad assumption of risk principles set forth in Mt.
Mansfield.S 4
A second type of law is the "delineated skier risk" statute such as
the one enacted in Utah55 which specifically defines those risks that
are inherent in skiing and bars recovery for injuries resulting from
those risks. Juries balance liability between the skier and ski area as
to injuries resulting from undelineated risks and activities.
The third kind of statute is the "enumerated ski area duty" type,
such as the one enacted in New Mexico,5 6 which sets forth the duties
of a ski area operator and requires that in order for a plaintiff to
recover, the jury must find the injury to have resulted from the
breach of such duties.
The fourth variety is that of "enumerated risk and duties balanc-.
ing test," the approach adopted by Colorado 7 and New York."8
This type of statute broadly sets forth the responsibilities of each
50. Ferguson, supra note 30, at 175 n.56.
S 1. The statutory analysis provided herein is cursory. For a more complete over-
view of skiing legislation and its relationship to other tort and negligence doctrines
within the same jurisdiction (i.e., comparative negligence principles), see, e.g.,
Fagen, supra note 1; Rubin, supra note 8; Ferguson, supra note 30; Diane Bernstein,
Note, The Snowballing Cost of Siding: Who Should Bear The Risk?, 7 CAnnozo
Axs & ENr. J. 153 (1988).
52. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1037 (Supp. 1991).
53. Id.
54. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1037 note (Supp. 1991) (Legislative Intent).
55. UTAH CODnE Aie. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1987).
56. N.M. STAT. Am. §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (Michie 1991).
57. CoLo. Rlv. STAT. §§ 33-44-101 to -111 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
58. N.Y. LAs. LAw §§ 865-868 (McKinney 1988). The New York law, for exam-
ple, requires ski area operators to patrol all open trails at least twice each day, to
log data regarding surface terrain and snow conditions, and to inform skiers of ob-
stacles or hazards other than those that arise from weather variations. Skiers are
required to follow a "safety in skiing code," which includes the duties not to ski on
closed slopes, to use equipment such as ankle straps or ski brakes to prevent "run-
away" skis from hurtling down the mountain, and generally to ski with regard to the
safety of the other skiers.
Ski Industry
party, and permits jury discretion in assessing liability based on the
facts of each case.
Post Legislative Decisions
While many cases which followed the Sunday decision resulted in
ski area liability for injuries incurred while skiing, the statistical
slide away from liability accelerated with the enactment of each
new state law. 9 In 1988, for instance, a Michigan court denied re-
covery to the estate of a skier fatally injured in a collision with a
tree.60 The court reasoned that the Michigan "delineated risk" stat-
ute includes within its risk parameters collisions with natural objects
such as trees.61 Similarly, a skier seriously injured in a collision with
a tree at California's Goldmine Ski Area was denied recovery in
1990 because California's "enumerated duty" statute did not extend
the obligation of ski areas to clear natural objects from the moun-
tain.6 2 In 1989, a New York court overturned a verdict in favor of
an injured skier who had been hurt when she crashed into wooden
poles holding a snow fence in place far off the trail.6 ' The court
found that the ski area had no duty to pad the poles, and that the
skier recklessly disregarded her duty to ski at a rate of speed that
would have allowed her to stop within a reasonable time and
distance.64
Only one recent case, Peer v. Aspen Skiing Co., 65 has sent a gen-
uinely cold shiver through the ski industry. Mr. Leslie Peer, an ex-
pert skier, was crippled in a fall on Ruthie's Run at Aspen on the
opening day of the 1982-83 ski season.66 On what he claimed was
his first run on the slope that season, Mr. Peer allegedly attempted to
59. See e.g., Ferguson, supra note 30. At least one commentator points out that
declining rates of success for non-catastrophically injured ski plaintiffs may also be
the product of evolving jury prejudices. Non-skiing jurors seem increasingly in-
clined to view skiing as a high risk activity undertaken at the skier's own peril,
while skiing jurors tend, as safety equipment advances, to view skiing as a safe
sport dangerous only to those who act unreasonably or carelessly. Most significant,
however, is the sympathy for the defendant often aroused in jurors who live in ve-
nues dependent upon the ski mountain to support their local economy (not includ-
ing Aspen)-a phenomenon that has grown with the sport's increasing
concentration of "destination resort" ski areas. See Rubin, supra note 8, at 112.
60. Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp., 428 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988).
61. Id. at 743-44 (citing Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, McH. Comp. LAws
§ 408.342(2) (1988) (Mxc. STAT. ANN. § 18.483(22)(2) (Callaghan 1984))).
62. Daniely v. Goldmine Ski Assocs., No. E005891 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22,
1990).
63. Nagawiecki v. State, 150 A.D.2d 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
64. Id. at 147.
65. No. 88CA0190 (Colo. App. Aug. 10, 1989), cert. granted, No. 89SC548
(Colo. Feb. 20, 1990), aH'd, 804 P.2d 166 (Colo. 1991).
66. Peer v. Aspen Skiing Co., 804 P.2d 166, 168 (Colo. 1991).
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negotiate it at a speed estimated by a witness to be thirty-five to fifty
miles per hour and fell when the trail crossed an unmarked snow-
covered service road.67 He testified that the accident probably
would not have occurred had he been skiing significantly slower.68
Despite that admission, a jury sympathetic to the severity of his inju-
ries awarded Mr. Peer $5 million.69 Aspen was found to have been
100 percent negligent for failing to post a sign warning of the sharp
and sudden transition in a groomed run, and for permitting the dan-
gerous condition to exist on the run.70
The court of appeals refused to grant Aspen's motion for a new
trial based on the affidavits of witnesses who came forward after the
verdict to testify that Mr. Peer had skied Ruthie's Run without inci-
dent many times, including twice on the day of the accident.7 1 The
court ruled that Aspen had failed to exercise reasonable diligence
in discovering this information prior to trial.72 The Supreme Court
of Colorado affirmed the decision of the court of appeals."
. The decision in Peer has created measured apprehension
throughout the ski industry, especially in Colorado. That anxiety
arises not only because Mr. Peer's acts of contributory negligence
were ignored in assessing the existence and scope of Aspen's duties,
but because it also represents a plaintiff victory in a case factually
identical to those of a prior landmark pro-ski area decision in
Colorado.
In Pizza v. Wolf Creek7 4 a skier seriously injured in a fall at Wolf
Creek Ski Area on a slope that intersected with a snow-covered ser-
vice road was denied recovery. This decision seems to indicate that
under Colorado state ski law, a skier has the heavy burden of prov-
ing that: 1) The ski area had a duty that it reasonably failed to fulfill;
2) the injury was proximately caused by the area's negligence; and
3) the skier did not assume the risk of such an injury (such as by
skiing at an excessive rate of speed).
Whether Peer represents an aberrational catastrophic injury ver-
dict or the start of a pro-plaintiff trend in Colorado away from the
Wolf Creek principles remains to be seen. If need be, says a ski
industry spokesperson, the Peer precedent may be "legislatively
corrected."75
67. Id. at 170.
68. Id. at 171.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Peer, 804 P.2d at 172.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 175.
74. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Dev. Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
75. Telephone interview with Irving Naylor of NSAA (Nov. 1991).
CONCLUSIONS
Although the propensity of Americans for filing lawsuits dealt the
ski industry a real scare during the late 1970's and early 1980's, the
sport appears to have emerged from the litigation mogul field with
plenty of life left in its knees. Today, the industry looks forward to
holding the line on lift ticket prices, opening new extreme terrain to
the public, and attracting a whole new generation of adventurers to
what may qualify as the world's most exciting outdoor sport.
Whether the industry meets those goals remains to be seen, but the
opportunity to do so has been established.
The issue remains, however, as to the culpability of litigators as
prime instigators of skiing's dark decade. Simply put, personal in-
jury lawyers did what they could to exploit the ski industry as a
steady source of injured plaintiffs. Absent legislative intervention,
litigators and their clients likely would have sued the ski industry
back into the Stone Age-with unscrupulous practitioners using the
usual amount of fraudulent claims to accomplish the devastation.
Fortunately, the ski industry was able to protect itself with a suc-
cessful effort, led by its own attorneys, to have equitably protective
legislation enacted throughout the country. In fact, ski litigation in-
directly produced some positive results for both skiers and ski areas.
For instance, the adversarial system led to enactment of laws under
which ski areas receive strong protections, but only if they exercise
due care in the performance of their duties. Thus these laws provide
ski areas with powerful incentives to ensure the safety of skiers.
Litigation and legislation have likewise led to development and
circulation of a skiers' code of conduct and responsibility. This list
of rules concerning skiing safety and courtesy is posted conspicu-
ously at nearly all ski areas in North America. It educates new ski-
ers and reminds experienced ones that it is their responsibility to ski
with care.76 That code of responsibility has been augmented, on
rare occasions, in Colorado since 1989 by criminal prosecutions of
grossly reckless skiers who cause grave injuries to their fellow
76. The Skiers Responsibility Code is an informal list of common sense "rules of
the road" endorsed by the National Ski Areas Association. They include the fol-
lowing responsibilities: (1) Ski under control and in such a manner so you can stop
or avoid other skiers or objects; (2) when skiing downhill or overtaking another
skier, you must avoid the skier below you; (3) you must not stop where you obstruct
a trail or are not visible from above; (4) when entering a trail or starting downhill,
yield to other skiers; (5) all skiers shall use devices to help prevent runaway skis;
and (6) you shall keep off closed trails and observe all posted signs. It should be
noted that many ski areas have also begun placing blunt statements of risk that
skiing is a dangerous activity that can result in catastrophic injury or death conspic-
uously at lift ticket purchase points, on lift tickets themselves, and even in ski resort
brochures. This has a dual purpose; to both shock the skier into realizing the neces-
sity for utmost care, and to bolster the ski area's chances for prevailing in lawsuits
in which "assumption of risk" is often a key issue.
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In the final analysis, the public relations "face plant"78 in the
snow that attorneys have taken over their alleged role in causing
damage to the ski industry has been-for the most part-unde-
served. Surely insurance companies must absorb a substantial por-
tion of blame for having caused the upheaval. What is more, the
positive outcome of the entire era serves to mitigate remaining guilt
that might have collectively accrued to the bar.
In light of the tenuous nature of the above conclusion, however,
the following quotes are provided as food for though for all attor-
neys (especially those that ski):
Said Abraham Lincoln, Springfield lawyer: "Never stir up liti-
gation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does
this."
Said Glen Plake, Mohawked extreme skier extraordinaire: "Ski
fast, don't fall." (Words to live. by, if performed with requisite
care).
77. See Rubin, supra note 8.
78. A "face plant" in skiing parlance is a fall resulting in the skier's head or face
being the first part of the body thrust into the snow, with varying degrees of injury
and humiliation arising therefrom. For a complete explanation of skiing slang and
humor, see A SmIER's DicrroNARY (1989), wherein the sport is succinctly described
as "the art of catching cold and going broke while rapidly heading nowhere at
great personal risk."
